Two operational formats namely mass customization and mass production can be implemented to satisfy customer preference-based demand. The mass customization system consists of two stages: the initial build-to-stock phase and the final customize-to-order phase. The mass production system has a single stage: building products with pre-determined specifications to stock. In each case, the company makes decisions on the number of initial product variants, product specifications, production quantities and product pricing. Under a uniform customer preference distribution, the optimal number of base-product variants resembles the well known economic order quantity solution, and the optimal product specifications are equally spaced. We characterize three possible benefits of mass customization: (i) the gained surplus from offering each customer her ideal product; (ii) extra revenue from price discrimination; and (iii) reduced costs due to risk pooling under stochastic demand.
Introduction
When contrasting the operational formats of mass production and mass customization, we note some pronounced differences. Mass production, with Henry Ford's Model T as its culmination, has the virtue of economy of scale. Specialized machines run at high levels of utilization in a maketo-stock environment and provide for an overall low manufacturing cost. While mass production can still be successful today in many traditional industries, advances in manufacturing and information technology, as well as rapid shifts in consumer behavior, have led to the adoption of a new, valuebased manufacturing philosophy. This has resulted in mass customization becoming an increasingly viable model for a broad range of different industries (Gilmore and Pine, 1997; The Economist, 2001; Business Week, 2002a; Time, 2002) . Based on sophisticated consumer interfaces, modular product architectures, agile manufacturing processes and speedy distribution, mass customization fundamentally caters to customer individualism.
Within the last decade, many companies have begun to turn to mass customization. From lipsticks to cars, from * Corresponding author M&M to chinos, a growing number of products can be customized to a customer's individual taste. Hewlett-Packard has effectively used postponement to realize mass customization in their printer and PC businesses (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997) . Levi Strauss launched the mass customization initiative to tailor women's jeans individually for a mass consumer group (Bailey, 2000) . The mass customization project at adidas-Salomon AG, "mi adidas", successfully completed its pilot phase involving well over 100 retailers across Europe (Seifert, 2002) . The phenomenon of mass customization is also becoming more prevalent in service industries, and individually customized financial, insurance and utility services are proliferating (Victor and Boynton, 1998) . Customization is becoming increasingly important to US companies since basic manufacturing and service functions are increasingly being outsourced to companies overseas. The biggest advantage of US companies is their closeness to customers and their ability to cater to the customers' individual needs (Sheffi, 2004) .
However, the promise of mass customization comes with potential pitfalls. A mismatch between technology and market demand can result in precisely what mass production is intended to avoid: namely, high cost (Zipkin, 2001) . For many firms today, it is difficult to know which strategy to pursue. Indeed, the relationship between market and operational conditions requires careful assessment in each case before conclusive decisions are made. When GE, for example, decided to redesign the family of Spectra RMS industrial circuit breakers (an $80 million business in 1995), they had to offer 650,000 model permutations due to little standardization in their product structure. Replacing all of them with one model obviously would not satisfy dispersed customer needs. How could GE gain customization flexibility in its products and still maintain the low manufacturing costs of mass production? In this case, some generic form of the product was first built, based on forecasts, and the remaining part of the product was customized to order. This is exactly the power of postponement for customization. This paper considers both mass production and mass customization as possible operational formats that can be employed to satisfy preference-based customer demands. There are two distinct types of customer preferences: (i) vertical differentiation; and (ii) horizontal differentiation. Under vertical differentiation, all customers agree over the preference ordering of the products: namely, quality is preferred by everybody (e.g., a Mercedes is always preferable to a Hyundai, a 30-inch TV is preferable to a 25-inch one). Quality and price discrimination to reveal hidden preference sensitivity information and to segment customers accordingly has been the focus of many research topics in vertical differentiation. Under horizontal differentiation, customers have different preferences on products (e.g., a circuit breaker with an electric current rating of 100 amperes); any deviation from the most-preferred product (e.g., a 50-ampere or a 200-ampere circuit breaker) would diminish customer satisfaction. Therefore, being precise is better. Since mass customization mainly revolves around customer tastes rather than product qualities, we focus on horizontal differentiation.
Given the preference-based demand, we address the following questions for mass customization and mass production: (i) what is the optimal number of product variants to offer? (ii) what are the optimal product specifications?
(iii) what prices should the company charge? (iv) how do the two operational formats of mass customization and mass production compare to one another?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature. In Section 3, we detail our general modeling framework for customer demand and the two operational formats (mass customization and mass production). In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze operational issues in mass customization and mass production respectively. In Section 6, we compare the two systems and discuss the impact of stochastic demand. In Section 7, we summarize managerial insights and provide directions for future research.
Literature review
Mass customization inevitably involves product differentiation, which has a long history in the economics literature.
In vertical differentiation, all customers prefer higher quality (Tirole, 1988) . Since mass customization is characterized by customer tastes rather than product qualities, our model is based on horizontal differentiation, whereby each customer has her own taste. In the linear city model, Hotelling (1929) considers buyers of a commodity to be uniformly distributed along a line segment of length l. Because one cannot appear in two places at the same time, each individual customer buys only a single product in the product group. Companies can place their business anywhere on the line segment. Each buyer transports her purchase home at a certain cost per unit distance. In general, the transportation cost can represent other causes leading to customer preference decline. Lancaster (1966 Lancaster ( , 1979 expands the linear city into a virtual space in product characteristics to study the product variety problem. Lancaster (1990) gives an excellent review of models of product differentiation regarding the individual consumer, individual firm, market equilibrium and social optimum. Our research takes the profit maximization perspective of an individual firm (conventional in the operations literature) and we consider specific operational details. It is along the lines of the Hotelling spatial location model that we develop our market demand and customer preference model with reservation price and disutility function. Our model is consistent with the long tradition of modeling in the economics literature, such as D' Aspremont et al. (1979) , Salop (1979) , Economides (1984) and De Palma et al. (1985) .
De Groote (1994), Chen et al. (1998) , and Dewan et al. (2000 Dewan et al. ( , 2003 adapted Hotelling-type models to operational contexts. De Groote (1994) first studied the marketing and manufacturing coordination problem for flexible manufacturing system. The focus is on the flexibility of the manufacturing system and the breadth of the product line. Chen et al. (1998) study a similar problem of product line design with physical attributes and customer preferences. Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and also Smith and Agrawal (2000) added inventory decisions to product selection problems. None of the above-mentioned models considered mass customization, for which the high cost of offering a large product variety could be effectively mitigated by postponement (Lee, 1996; Lee and Tang, 1997; Swaminathan and Tayur, 1998; Swaminathan and Lee. 2003) . A series of empirical studies in the bicycle industry and the automotive industry provide valuable insights into the relationship between product variety and supply chain costs (MacDuffie et al., 1996; Ulrich et al., 1998; Fisher and Ittner, 1999; Randall and Ulrich, 2001 ). Randall and Ulrich (2001) note that the effectiveness of a high-variety postponement strategy depends not only on a supply chain's ability to deliver variety, but also on its ability to successfully reach its target market. Our analytical model of mass customization reinforces this notion.
Studies of product variety in the marketing literature have focused on the product line selection problem to maximize revenue or market share of a company (Green and Krieger, 1985; Kalish, 1988, 1993; Chen and Hausman, 2000) . These works do not consider the cost of supplying the product variety, whereas our model framework incorporates both the operational costs and the market value of mass customization.
Model framework
In this section, we provide an overview of the generic model framework that underlines our analysis. In Section 3.1, we outline the general market demand and customer preference model. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we introduce our representation of the mass customization and mass production systems.
Market demand and customer preference model
Let D denote the overall market demand for all products that belong to a certain product category. We assume D is a random variable with mean and standard deviation (µ, σ ). Product specification θ belongs to a line segment = [0, 1]. The implicit assumption here is that the specification is continuously quantifiable. Customer types are indexed by variable x, uniformly distributed in with a probability density function f(x) and cumulative density function F(x). Thus, each customer has a most preferred product represented by its specification. Each customer purchases either one unit of a product or nothing.
We decompose customer x's evaluation of product θ into two parts. First, we denote p 0 (x) as the reservation price for customer x's most preferred product, which is the price customer x is willing to pay for her ideal product. Customers who cannot get their ideal products may buy somewhat less desirable ones, if they can pay less than what they would have paid for their first choice. The more the available product strays from what customers really want, the bigger the discount they would seek. This leads to the second part of the utility function: how customer x devalues an arbitrary product θ that is different from her ideal. We denote u(x, θ) as the disutility function. Therefore, payoff for customer x purchasing product θ at price p(θ) is:
Consider the linear market case, in which a customer's reservation price is linear to her type (Chen et al., 1998) , i.e., p 0 (x) = p 0 + ax. The special case of a = 0 is the common horizontal product differentiation model. When a > 0, higher types of customers are willing to pay more for their ideal products. For example, a customer who wants a 200-ampere circuit breaker is willing to pay more than a customer who wants a 100-ampere circuit breaker. The model thus represents a more general horizontal differentiation. Fundamentally, the customer who needs the 100-ampere circuit breaker would still not prefer the 200-ampere one. This is quite different from vertical differentiation under which everyone prefers more to less.
Also, consider a linear disutility function: u(x, θ ) = λ|θ − x|. Here, λ ≥ 0 represents customers' preference sensitivity. Higher values of λ mean customers are more particular about their ideal products, whereas smaller values of λ mean customers are less sensitive. This form of disutility function, consistent with the Hotelling tradition, has been extensively used in the literature (e.g., De Groote, 1994; Chen et al., 1998; Dewan et al., 2000 Dewan et al., , 2003 , and has been generalized in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) . If customers are only willing to sacrifice their desires for products with higher attributes than their ideal and regard products with lower specifications as non-functional, then u(
As λ ≥ 0, the model does not characterize product quality differences (such as Mercedes vs. Hyundai).
The GE's Spectra RMS circuit breaker case is well represented by the outlined model. The circuit breakers are designed to provide overload and overcurrent protection to electrical distribution and utilization equipment. The breaker body is in the shape of a square molded case with different frame sizes, each of which accepts a range of rating plugs that determine the electric current rating of the breaker. For example, one frame can handle rating plugs of 7, 30, 60, 100 and a maximum of 150 amperes. The bigger the frame size, the bigger is the maximum rating plug that can fit into the frame. A customer is almost indifferent to frame sizes as long as their maximum current protection is assured. Smaller frames that cannot handle the required maximum current are not useful to the customer. Metal rods have similar characteristics: rods of a longer length than that which is desired are still usable (they can be cut); rods of a shorter length are useless.
Mass production system
Mass production systems are prominently characterized by the production of finished goods to stock. Thus, the number of product variants, their specifications and production quantity must be determined before the market demand information is revealed. In addition, mass production is commonly linked to conventional sales channels with physical stores, where each variant of product is displayed and sold at a uniform price to different customers. Each customer picks the product that serves her best. There can be other reasons for producing pre-made products as opposed to custom-made products, such as customers who need a product right away. However, that aspect is not the focus of the current study.
Economies of scale in mass production are captured through the fixed cost K of introducing each new product variant, which could include redesign, tooling and setup costs. Furthermore, if we assume a constant unit production cost, the cost of producing s units of product θ is c(θ, s) = c(θ)s, where c(θ ) is the unit production cost of product θ. We then define the derivative c (θ) as the marginal cost of product differentiation. When a higher θ requires more materials, as in the production of frames, steel bars and clothes, the cost for the product θ can be linear in θ, i.e., c(θ) = c 0 + c 1 θ . Hence, c (θ) = c 1 . It is reasonable to assume that a ≥ c 1 , which means that the marginal cost of product differentiation does not exceed the first-best marginal revenue. The cost c 0 is the fixed cost of manufacturing each unit of a product (independent of the product specification), whereas the cost K is the one-time fixed cost of introducing a base-product variant (independent of its production quantity).
Mass customization system
As an ideal, mass customization should provide customers with anything they want, at any time. In reality, companies providing symbolic product variants with one-dimensional specifications might come closest to this goal. We see such examples in soap stamped with customers' names, cookies glazed with customers' pictures, and websites with personal greetings on the front page. Companies providing more substantial mass customization often have low-cost customization processes. Mixing a variety of color pigments with a generic paint (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997) , adding unique ingredients to base formulas of cosmetics (Time, 2002) , inserting plug-and-play parts into the standard expansion slots of a computer, cutting longer steel bars, or grinding mechanical parts to meet lower dimensional specifications fall into this category.
In the above-mentioned cases, some form of initial base product (the soap or the generic paint) already exists in stock waiting to be customized for individual orders. Building a customized personal computer doesn't mean that the manufacturer has to start from a raw wafer to meet each order. In fact, the metal industry has long been using a mixed strategy: rods of different lengths are first produced in anticipation of customer demand, and these larger objects are then cut in response to actual customer orders of various lengths (Krichagina et al., 1998) . After the redesign of their product, GE also used the modular concept for the Spectra RMS product line. The rating plugs are interchangeable and easy to install on different sizes of frames. Generic inventories for a limited number of base-product specifications are first mass-produced, then the company observes the individual customer's order specification, and customizes a certain base product to satisfy that particular customer request. This is essentially a postponement strategy to allow for mass customization (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997) .
Since each customer x gets a different product, price discrimination can be effectively applied by the company. If the new product introduction and development of the initial base-product variant is the same process as in the mass production system, we can assume that mass customization and mass production operate with the same fixed costs K. We first derive results with the same base-product introduction cost K for mass customization and mass production. Implications of different fixed costs are also discussed.
The unit product cost of mass customization, however, is higher than that of mass production. As in the mass production system, the unit cost of making a base product θ is c(θ) = c 0 + c 1 θ . In addition, a mass customization system incurs certain customization costs. Corresponding to the upside disutility function, base products can only be downward customized. The unit cost of customizing base product θ to satisfy customer x's ideal preference is c 2 + c 3 (θ − x) if θ ≥ x, and +∞ if θ < x, where c 2 is the fixed customization cost and c 3 is the marginal customization cost. Here, each unit of product customization has at least a cost of c 2 , which consists of the costs of information elicitation, manufacturing, distribution, and customer service. In addition, the customization cost can be proportional to the reduction in product specification. Such downward customization in a horizontally differentiated product space can represent reducing the physical size of a product; the greater the decrease in size from the base product, the higher the cost of customization. In fact, the minimization of the trim loss is often referred to as the cutting stock problem in the OR literature, first introduced by Gomory (1961, 1963) and followed by a vast body of works (see Cheng et al. (1994) for a survey). The customization process of Levi Strauss is another example, whereby jeans are soaked and dried with individual customers wearing them so that they can be shrunk to each customer's exact fit (Bailey, 2000) . In the GE example, the customization itself (inserting a particular rating plug into a circuit breaker) is independent of the specification change and we just let c 3 = 0.
Mass customization for more complex products is often performed through modularity and standardization. With modular product design, several key modules and a stock of varieties for each module are provided so that customers can mix and match to customize their own products. Dell computer is a prime example of this model. Some key auto manufacturers are also exploring this approach. Known as the "3DayCar" project, car-makers such as Volkswagen, Ford, General Motors, Nissan, Honda and Peugeot set out to see if the Dell model could be applied to car-making (The Economist, 2001) . With a modular process, production is broken down into subprocesses to provide flexibility. As the study of product modularity and assembly introduces additional complexity into the problem, we focus on the one-dimensional customization observed in many industries to compare the mass customization system with the mass production system.
A multi-dimensional problem can be decomposed into multiple one-dimensional problems if the different attributes are independent in demand and production. Interested readers can refer to Schmidt and Porteus (2000) for multi-dimensional, vertically differentiated product attributes that are affine in customer type.
Operational issues in mass customization
Since orders are individually fulfilled according to customers' specified requirements, the company can charge each customer her reservation price p 0 (x) for her ideal product, thus capturing the entire customer surplus (firstdegree price discrimination). No arbitrage between customers exists in this case, because the upside disutility function eliminates the potential arbitrage market. For other disutility functions, arbitrage itself becomes an assumption, which can often be justified by a significant transaction cost associated with it. We start with the first-degree price discrimination, then later discuss the second-best, whereby the company only charges different prices to different groups of customers. This practice can save companies efforts in implementing the first-degree price discrimination scheme. Particularly, we will study the scenario of customers being charged the same price for their ideal products if their initial base products are of the same specification.
The company collects a non-negative profit on sales to every customer. A sufficient condition for this to happen is c 0 + c 1 + c 2 + c 3 ≤ p 0 , which means that the upper limit of the unit cost of a customized product is no higher than the lower limit of the unit revenue. Even though this particular condition may not always be satisfied, any increase in the number of base-product variants can relax the condition. If production has increasing returns to scale, i.e., the average cost of producing one unit of product θ is actually lower when the production volume s is bigger, the condition can be further relaxed. Furthermore, if the market is not completely covered, the left-out customers would be clustered at the bottom of the customer space, because it is not optimal to leave unsatisfied customers above any base product when customer-preference distribution function f (x) is non-decreasing (Jiang and Lee, 2004) . Resizing the product space would make the whole market again be covered. The following study focuses on the scenario of a company selling to the entire market.
Optimal product-offering decisions
The company makes three decisions concerning its product offering: the number of base-product variants n to produce initially; the corresponding initial product specifications θ i , and their production quantities s i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We first address the problems assuming that the total demand D is deterministic, i.e., D = µ. Since each base product θ i covers the customers between θ i−1 and θ i due to the one-sided customization technology, the production quantity for θ i is
, where θ 0 = 0, θ n = 1. The inventory decisions under stochastic demand will be discussed later. The manufacturer's profit function is:
where a = a + c 3 , c 0 = c 0 + c 2 and c 1 = c 1 + c 3 . Since the revenue term is independent of n and θ i (i = 1, . . . , n − 1), the manufacturer can focus on the following cost minimization problem:
We first solve the subproblem for optimal product specifications θ i , given the number of base products n: c = min
It is obvious that this cost function is monotonically decreasing in the number of initial base-product variants n. We can characterize the optimal product specifications.
Proposition 1. The optimal product-offering solution is
. . , n, and the minimum cost is c
The proof for this and other propositions are presented in Appendix A.
For the product specification decision, θ i = i/n denotes an equal space policy and F(θ i ) = i/n denotes an equal fractile policy. c es and c ef may be defined as the manufacturer's cost in Equation (3) from the equal space policy and the equal fractile policy, respectively. The result is driven by the uniform distribution of customer preference. The upside disutility and downward customization assumptions simplify the problem setting but do not change our structural results. They can be relaxed to symmetric functions and the optimal product positions would simply shift downwards by 1/2n and still be equally spaced. With the optimal product positions, we can now solve the optimal number of base-product variants from Equation (2) and derive the total profit for the mass customization system in Equation (1).
Proposition 2. The optimal number of initial product variants is n c = c 1 µ/(2K) and the corresponding profit is
Since n c is an integer, the true optimal n * c could be either one of the two consecutive integers between which c 1 µ/(2K) lies. A higher marginal cost of product differentiation (c 1 ) and customization (c 3 ) and a lower fixed cost K result in more initial product variants. Notice that n c is independent of c 2 because the fixed customization cost, c 2 µ, is independent of n.
The total cost of introducing new base-product variants, Kn, is linear in the number of product variants; the total cost of mass customization, [c 0 + c 1 (1 + 1/n)/2 − c 3 /2]µ, is reciprocal in n as more base-product variants reduce the cost of customization. The result therefore resembles the wellknown Egconomic Order Quantity (EOQ) solution. The fundamental trade-off that drives the EOQ-like result is the fixed cost K per product variant introduction and the cost of customization. The number of initial product variants n c corresponds to the order frequency in the EOQ model. The production quantity for each variant s = µ/n c = 2Kµ/c 1 corresponds to the EOQ.
Note that the first term in the optimal profit function, [p 0 − c 0 + (a − c 1 )/2]µ, can be regarded as the profit from the average customer at x = 1/2. Also, the second term c 1 µ/(2n c ) = 2c 1 µK is the cost adjustment due to product differentiation and customization. Similar to the EOQ model, the optimal cost adjustment equals the optimal fixed cost, 2c 1 µK, which is an increasing concave function of the parameters. The optimal number of product variants is robust in the sense that, if n is off the optimal, say by 50%, the resulting cost is only about 8% higher than the optimal. Thus, this result has significant managerial implications: large errors in the number of initial product variants lead to relatively small cost penalties provided that the optimal product specification (the equal space policy) is used.
Second-best pricing scheme
Many companies use an incremental pricing scheme instead of complete first-degree price discrimination for ease of implementation. Customers are segmented into different groups. Prices for the customized products are the same within the group but are different across groups. A natural way of segmenting the customers is to group customers according to the initial base product. Recall that all customers x ∈ (θ i−1 , θ i ] are satisfied by the same initial product θ i . The prices for customer x ∈ (θ i−1 , θ i ] would simply be p 0 (θ i−1 ) = p 0 + aθ i−1 Since the disutility function is onedirectional, the pricing scheme is incentive compatible (no arbitrage) for all customers. Comparing the second-best pricing scheme to the first-best price discrimination, we can see that the optimal number of initial product variants increases and the total profit drops due to the lost revenue from the first-degree price discrimination. Obviously, the two pricing schemes are identical when the reservation prices are the same for all customers (a = 0). When a > 0, moving to more discriminatory prices would reduce the number of base-product variants.
Proposition 3. Under second-best pricing, the equal space and equal fractile policy is optimal, the optimal number of initial product variants is n

Heuristics for non-uniform customer preference
We extend the distribution of individual customer preferences x to a beta distribution with probability density function f(x) and cumulative density function F(x). Two shape parameters ν and ω characterize a beta distribution (Johnson and Kotz, 1969) . When ν = ω = 1, the beta distribution degenerates into the uniform distribution. A beta distribution can have a very general shape and is constrained to the interval [0, 1] without need for truncation. It has been widely used in the literature to model consumerpreference distributions. To characterize the distance between adjacent products in the product space, we define the space spectrum i = θ i − θ i−1 and the fractile spectrum
. We have the following monotonicity property.
Proposition 4. The optimal space spectrum i (the optimal fractile spectrum F i ) is decreasing (increasing) in i when f(·) is increasing. The opposite is true when f(·) is decreasing.
The two optimal spectrums i and F i together control the optimal distance between adjacent products. The result can help companies perform a quick base-line check of their product positions when their customers' preference distribution is not uniform. For any unimodal f(·), the space spectrum i should be first decreasing then increasing (i.e., products are first positioned increasingly closer then increasingly apart once the peak of f(·) is passed). The complete product specifications can be characterized for increasing density function f(·). If the customer preference follows a beta distribution with ν > ω = 1, then the optimal product specifications can be determined:
However, product variants are often equally spaced for simplicity of implementation. It is therefore important to see how the equal space policy and the equal fractile policy perform under non-uniform customer-preference distribution. For general customer-preference distributions, the costs of the two equal policies c es and c ef have the following properties. For a wide variety of increasing density functions (ν = 2, . . . , 20, ω = 1, n = 2, . . . , 50), Figs. 1-4 show the performance of the equal policies in comparison to the optimal. The cost increase of the equal fractile policy from the optimal is bounded by 0.404%, whereas the cost of the equal space policy can have up to a 5.5% increase from the optimal. The equal fractile policy seems to be a very good heuristic when f (·) is increasing. According to Proposition 5 part 3, the equal space policy would be a better choice for decreasing f(·). Since any unimodal f (·) has a monotonic increasing interval on [0, 1], followed by a monotonic decreasing interval, we can conclude that an equal fractile policy followed by an equal space policy would yield closeto-optimal results. Interestingly, the cost of the equal space and fractile policies under a symmetric customer-preference distribution (ν = ω) is the same as the optimal cost under uniform preferences (see Proposition 1). As a result, when customers become more heterogeneous (a flatter f(·) function), companies' profits would suffer; yet the performance of the equal space and fractile policies would improve. As the deficiency of the equal space and fractile policies and the EOQ-type solution are both very small, the combination of the two as a heuristic can result in close-tooptimal performance for a general distribution of customer preferences.
Operational issues in mass production
We focus on a uniform customer-preference distribution (ν = ω = 1) in the following analysis. Mass-produced products are often mass distributed and sold in an open market. The sales price of a particular product must be the same to all customers. Essentially, the customer-preference distribution is known, yet an individual customer's type is unobservable to the manufacturer. Customization therefore is not an option. Each customer buys the product that maximizes her utility. The three decisions n, θ i and p i for the manufacturer can be determined in reverse order.
Lemma 1. The optimal price for product i is p i
When the product margin is low enough ( i > 0), only a fraction of the customer segment covered by product θ i will make a purchase. The firm thus leverages monopoly pricing to rule out less profitable customers and only serves high-margin customers within that segment. On the other hand, when the product margin is high ( i ≤ 0), the demand function is inelastic and every customer in the segment will make a purchase. Jiang and Lee (2004) conclude that it is always optimal to place the initial base product at the top of a product segment for non-decreasing customer-preference distribution, regardless of whether or not the whole segment is covered. Therefore, it is easy to see that uncovered customers, if they exist, will be clustered at the bottom of the customer space [0, θ R ] where θ R < θ 1 , and all customers above θ R will make a purchase ( i ≤ 0 for i = 2, . . . , n). The following study focuses on the scenario of θ R = 0 (i.e., the whole market is covered). The manufacturer's profit function is:
where a = a + λ and c 1 = c 1 + λ. In comparison to the mass customization system profit function of Equation (1), the term a (x − θ i−1 ) can be interpreted as an information rent that the manufacturer must grant to customer x because the individual customer's preference is unobservable to the manufacturer. The information rent decreases from the highest customer type to the lowest in each segment covered by product θ i .
Proposition 6. Under a mass production system, the equal space and equal fractile policies are optimal, the optimal number of product variants is n p = (c 1 + a )µ/(2K) and the optimal profit is
The true optimal n * p could be one of the two consecutive integers between which (c 1 + a )µ/(2K) lies. The structure of the optimal number of product variants in mass production is the same as that in mass customization except that c 1 (or c 1 + a under second-best pricing) is substituted with (c 1 + a ). We compare the two systems and characterize the potential benefits of mass customization.
Mass customization compared to mass production
Let be the difference between the optimal profit of mass customization and that of mass production under uniform customer-preference distribution, i.e., = √ 2µK(
Proposition 7. The mass customization system outperforms the mass production system if and only if
The comparison essentially reveals the cost (the right-hand side of the condition) and benefit (the left-hand side) of mass customization. The customization cost consists of the fixed cost that is independent of product attribute change (the c 2 µ/(2K) term) and the incremental cost that is proportional to the magnitude of the product modification from the base products (the √ c 1 + c 3 term). Here, the marginal cost of mass customization (c 3 ) is analogous to the transportation cost in the uniform delivered price model in the traditional horizontal differentiation literature, and the disutility function (λ) in mass production is analogous to the customer transportation cost in the uniform free-onboard price model (Tirole, 1988, p. 40) .
Comparing the terms √ c 1 + a + 2λ and √ c 1 + c 3 , we can characterize the benefits of mass customization by the two additional terms on the benefit side: 2λ and a. The term 2λ represents the additional revenue from satisfying each customer by providing her ideal product (not obtainable under mass production, whereby customers are only provided with generic products that they would pay less for, with a disutility function of slope λ); the term a represents the additional revenue from the first-degree price discrimination that can not be obtained under mass production. We call the first benefit of mass customization the perfectfit benefit and the second benefit the price-discrimination benefit. The price-discrimination benefit vanishes under second-best pricing (the cost term √ c 1 + c 3 replaced by √ c 1 + c 3 + a). Even without the price discrimination, mass customization may still be better than mass production due to the perfect-fit benefit. Because mass customization can be superior even if c 3 > λ, it is certainly a strategy whereby companies can reap the surplus that previously belongs to the customers in the mass production system. It was mainly from the perfect-fit benefit of customization that companies such as Lands' End's made their business so successful.
As the overall market demand D increases, mass production eventually outperforms mass customization if c 2 > 0 (Fig. 5) . In one extreme case of c 1 = c 3 = a = 0, the benefit of customization increases in a square root fashion with regard to demand (2 √ Kλ × √ µ) but the cost of customization increases linearly in total demand (c 2 × µ). Thus, the idea of using local customization to bring back some of the jobs lost to Asia's low-cost mass production system can only be feasible to a certain extent. Manufacturing of high-volume commodities such as non-fashion apparel, basic consumer electronics and home appliances may not come back to the US anytime soon. The cross-over demand threshold, however, continues to increase as the customization costs (c 2 and c 3 ) keep on falling. In addition, a shorter life cycle of products means that the total market demand D would fall, thus making mass customization more attractive. Since the number of initial product variants n c < n p if and only if c 3 < a + 2λ and mass customization dominates mass production only if c 3 < a + 2λ, a superior mass customization system actually reduces the initial number of base-product variants compared to a mass production system. Even though mass customization introduces a tremendous amount of product variety in finished goods, an efficient customization system actually requires fewer initial base-product variants than mass production. GE, for example, reduced the base frame sizes for its RMS circuit breakers to four and were still able to support more than 50 electric current specifications through standard rating plugs. Standardization therefore could be an effective strategy for mitigating the negative effects of customization on supply chain operations. The recent trend in cross-over vehicles and the proliferation of different car models indeed rewarded companies such as Toyota, Volkswagen and Honda, who excel at incorporating shared components into different models (Business Week, 2002b) . Now consider the case in which the base-product introduction cost K is not the same for mass customization and mass production. The profit difference between the two systems can be expressed as = 2µK p ( √ c 1 + a + 2λ − (c 1 + c 3 )K c /K p ) − c 2 µ where K c and K p are the fixed product introduction costs for mass customization and mass production respectively. The two benefits of mass customization (the perfect-fit benefit and the pricediscimination benefit) are kept the same. The threshold demand, beyond which mass production dominates mass customization, decreases in K c . The optimal number of initial product variants n c < n p if and only if c 3 K p /K c < a + 2λ when the marginal cost of product differentiation c 1 is zero. As mass customization outperforms mass production only if c 3 K c /K p < a + 2λ (when c 1 = 0), a superior mass customization system reduces the number of base-product
The analysis so far deals with deterministic demand D = µ. Every customer is an average customer in that the profit from each individual customer is the expected profit based on the customer-preference distribution. We shall now look at the company's product design and inventory decisions while considering the stochastic nature of customer demand.
Stochastic demand
Let µ and σ denote the mean and standard deviation of the total demand D respectively. Assume that customer demand between θ i−1 and θ i is to be met by product θ i only, (i.e., there is no product substitution from higher-product options to satisfy excess demand for θ i ).
Let µ i be the mean of the demand D i for base product θ i and σ i be the standard deviation under a uniform customerpreference distribution, where µ i = µ(θ i − θ i−1 ) and σ i = σ (θ i − θ i−1 ). Let z i be the safety-stock factor for product θ i . When the company operates with a uniform customer service level for all base products, we have z i = z for i = 1, . . . n. Thus, the production quantity for product θ i can be written as s i = µ i + zσ i . The manufacturer's profit function under mass customization becomes.
where L(s i ) is the expected loss function due to demand uncertainty for product θ i . If we use a normal distribution to approximate the demand for product θ i we get
/2 is the average underage cost for base product θ i , and I N (z) is the unit normal loss function. The total inventory cost
Since z is over seven-times bigger than I N (z) when the stockout probability is less than 20% (Porteus, 2002, p. 26) , this condition is easy to satisfy. Consequently, the optimal number of base-product variants is n c = {(c 1 + c 3 )S − c 3 [z + I N (z)]σ }/(2K), where S = µ + zσ is the total production quantity, including safety stock. The result from the deterministic problem formulated as Equation (1) is a special case of σ = 0 (see Appendix B for details). Thus, the total demand uncertainty increases a company's operating cost and the number of base-product variants (given c 1 z − c 3 I N (z) ≥ 0).
The analysis for mass production can be similarly adapted from Equation (4). Consequently, mass customization outperforms mass production if and only if
. Since I N (z) < 1 when the stockout probability is less than 80%, we have µ − I N (z) > 0 in any realistic case. Thus, c 3 < a + 2λ, the necessary condition under which the mass customization system is better than the mass production system, is preserved under stochastic total demand.
Random individual choice
In the above-mentioned model, we still use the average customer concept. It is equivalent to dividing each individual customer into all possible preferences in [0, 1] following the uniform distribution. Thus, the demands for various base products have a perfect positive correlation. In consumer choice models, each individual customer is an independent decision-maker who realizes her preference based on the preference distribution. Thus, in addition to the variability of the total demand D, the random choice of each individual customer also contributes to the variability of the demand for product θ i . The probability that a customer falls into the coverage of base product θ i is i = (θ i − θ i−1 ). Hence,
i and the production quantity for θ i will increase accordingly. Since (Kapuscinski and Tayur, 1999) , the equal policy is not preserved if considering inventory costs. The exact positions of the base products depend on the trade-off between the production costs and the inventory costs.
The impact on the number of base products consequently is even harder to track. Let us examine the sum-of-demand standard deviations under an equal space policy for some qualitative insights. We have
If we assume that the inventory cost is proportional to the sum-of-demand standard deviations (Lee and Tang, 1998; Kapuscinski and Tayur, 1999) , the total cost is (c 0 + c 1 /2 − c 3 /2)µ + c 1 µ/(2n) + Kn + β µ(n − 1) + σ 2 , where β is a constant. The cost function increases in n for n > n c = c 1 µ/(2K) and there may exist n * (n * < n c ), at which the total cost is smaller than that of the deterministic solution. Therefore, random customer preference realization actually reduces the optimal number of base products from the optimal number n c of the deterministic case. The same is true for mass production. If mass customization produces fewer base-product variants in the deterministic model (n c < n p ) it also offers fewer base variants in the stochastic model. As a result, the cost increase is less for mass customization only if n c < n p (or c 3 < a + 2λ) under deterministic demand. Interestingly, indifferent customers (a small λ) give a bigger risk-pooling benefit to the mass production system.
The impact of stochastic demand on mass customization but mass production is demonstrated by a numerical example in Fig. 6 0, c 3 = 0.5, λ = 0.25, µ = 400, σ = 15, K = 25, fillrate 95.5%). The σ = 0 series represents the case of deterministic demand; the σ > 0, ρ = 1 series represents the case of stochastic demand without random individual choice; the σ > 0, ρ < 1 series represents the case of stochastic demand with random individual choice. As the customization cost is relatively low in this example (c 3 < a + 2λ), mass customization is a better option than mass production. Under deterministic demand, the optimal number of baseproduct variants of the mass customization system (n c = 3) is smaller than that of the mass production system (n p = 5). Stochastic demand (σ > 0, ρ = 1) reduces the company's profit in comparison to the deterministic case, due to extra inventory costs, but the optimal number of base-product variants is kept the same (they could be higher if the demand variation is large). Furthermore, the equal space and fractile policies are still optimal. Mass customization continues to be the system with a higher profit. With random individual choice (σ > 0, ρ < 1), the company's profit is further reduced. The optimal number of base-product variants also decreases (n c = 2, n p = 3) for the benefit of risk pooling and the equal policy is no longer optimal (e.g., θ 1 = 0.329, θ 2 = 0.662, θ 3 = 1 for mass production). The reduction in profit is smaller for mass customization (80.9) than for mass production (147.8).
Total demand variation thus increases the number of base-product variants n whereas random individual choice reduces n. In both cases, the system with a higher profit under deterministic demand remains a better system under stochastic demand.
Managerial insights
A mass customization system can be decoupled into two stages. The mass stage is the make-to-stock phase for certain base-product variants based on the demand forecast; the customization stage is the make-to-order phase for customers' ideal products based on individual orders. A mass production system has only one stage: the mass make-tostock stage. In reality, under mass production, the end product is directly produced, whereas, under mass customization, semifinished goods are generally first produced in the mass stage and are assembled to order in the customization stage. Our study does not explicitly model semifinished goods and the interaction among the multiple levels of production, as we focus on a one-dimensional product attribute.
The fundamental trade-off in deciding the number of base-product variants n is the fixed cost of introducing a new base product (linear in n) and the cost of customization (inversely proportional to n). The result, thus, resembles the famous EOQ solution. Consequently, the optimal number of base-product variants is robust; a large deviation from the optimum results in a relatively small penalty. A superior mass customization system can actually reduce the optimal number of initial product variants. This may partially explain why companies such as Toyota and Volkswagen are reducing their number of component modules while increasing final product variety to satisfy individual customer requirements.
GE pioneered the industrial customization business with its product line of Spectra RMS circuit breakers in 1995. The industrial circuit breakers are to provide overload protection to a wide range of electrical utilization equipment with different requirements. Each circuit breaker has an array of interchangeable rating plugs for changing a current rating up to the maximum rating of the frame. Bigger frames require more materials to build, even though they have no added value to customers if their maximum current requirement can be satisfied with smaller frames. Through a redesign, GE successfully reduced its total number of base frames to four sizes (E, F, G and K) and still managed to satisfy more than 50 electric current ratings.
Similar to GE in 1995, many businesses today are facing a strategic decision of whether and how to move from a mass production system to a mass customization system as customer preferences become more diversified and more finicky. Customization could be an advantage for US manufacturers in competition with the low-cost mass production manufacturers in Asia, because the US companies are closer to the market and have a deeper knowledge of customers' preferences. The benefits of such mass customization may come from one or more of the following three sources:
1. the perfect-fit benefit of satisfying each customer's exact preference; 2. the extra revenue from customization-enabled price discrimination; 3. the reduced inventory costs due to risk pooling.
Successful stories in mass customization, to date, such as Lands' End's custom clothes, are mainly based on benefit 1. Benefit 2 is a natural next step as companies gather more customer-preference information from the implementation of perfect-fit customization and develop more sophisticated pricing strategies. When the product design is kept constant, mass customization has benefit 3 (the inventory risk pooling) as is observed in the standard literature. However, when designs can change, the risk-pooling benefit of mass customization in inventory may not exist for those business sectors that have customers with insensitive preferences. In fact, some consumer package goods companies, who typically face less-sensitive customers, often intentionally increase customers' preference sensitivity by marketing and, at the same time, use a two-stage customization model to benefit from risk pooling.
Mass customization is also more favorable in smaller markets. There is often a cross-over demand, above which a mass production system becomes more beneficial. Therefore, the loss of manufacturing certain high-volume commodities to Asian low-cost mass producers may be hard to get back. For markets with a broad range of fast-changing customer tastes and with shorter product life cycles, however, advancement in customization technology may bring some manufacturing jobs back to the US through local customization.
In future research, the effect of product substitution on both mass customization and mass production is worth further investigation. When facing shortages of a certain base product, a company can substitute shortage products with excess products of higher specifications. Clearly, when all product options are perfectly positively correlated (σ i = σ i ), such substitutions would not happen because all base products would have excesses or shortages at the same time.
Under random individual choice, products with higher specifications can be used to fulfill shortages of lowerspecification products. Therefore, the inventory cost would be smaller due to the additional risk pooling across products. For example, the inventory loss function for product θ 1 could be reduced by a term proportional to E{min[(D 1 − s 1 ) + , (s 2 − D 2 ) + ]} in the case of two-base-product variants. Analysis for product substitution even without product design variables is known to be difficult, but certain properties regarding the monotonicity of inventory decisions for multiple base products and their specifications might be obtainable under a uniform customerpreference distribution. We also propose to analyze more general types of consumer disutility functions and multidimensional customer preferences, such as adding customer waiting time as an additional dimension in the utility function.
In conclusion, we get c es ≥ c ef when ω = 1 and ν ≥ 1 for the case of n = 2. Equality holds when ν = ω or ν → +∞.
Part 2: By the symmetry of the beta distribution when ν = ω, F((n − i)/n) + F(i/n) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Then we can write that:
By the symmetry of the beta distribution when ν = ω, F −1 (i/n) + F −1 ((n − i)/n) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Then we can write that: 
